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This paper undertakes a conceptual enquiry into the idea of
the expectations gap. This method of enquiry is explained as
a philosophical investigation into the concepts used in the
literature relating to the expectations gap. A descriptive
conceptual enquiry is undertaken into the current use of the
expression ‘expectations gap’ and the related terms
‘expectation’ and ‘expects’. It is argued that vagueness and
misunderstandings of the uses of these expressions
undermines a grasp of the issues involved and of how they are
to be resolved. The paper looks at the various explanations of
these expressions in the literature and suggests that more
clarity in discussions of the issues would be achieved by
characterizing expectations as beliefs about what auditors do or
desires for them to perform certain procedures with certain
qualities in audits. The grounds for the beliefs are considered.
The belief that the auditor will do something because of a
belief that it is a duty is examined. The way in which the
auditor’s beliefs that something is a duty determines what they
do is explained through the idea of practical reasoning. The
paper goes on to explore the suggestion that an expectation
might also be some kind of desire that auditors perform certain
actions in the context of an audit. These desires are related to a
consideration of the objectives of auditing. The idea of the
reasonableness of these desires is examined. The reasons for
wanting auditors to undertake particular procedures can also
underlie the acceptance of particular meanings of ‘audit’ and
‘auditing’. The audit expectations gap is reconfigured in terms
of the beliefs and desires identified in the paper.
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objectives of auditing.
SUMMARY
This paper undertakes a conceptual enquiry into
the idea of the ‘expectations gap’. The method of
conceptual enquiry is explained. A descriptive
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conceptual enquiry is undertaken by reviewing
explanations of the expression ‘expectations gap’ in
the literature. Although there are a number of ways
of characterizing the gap, many of these explain the
gap as involving differences in beliefs about what
auditing involves and/or in desires that auditors
perform certain functions in particular ways. The
nature of expectations is examined by exploring
these beliefs and desires. Different grounds for
these expectations are identified. Beliefs about
what auditors do may be based on empirical beliefs
about the duties of auditors. The grounds for
desires are explored using the notion of practical
reasoning.A desire that auditors perform actions or
perform them in particular ways may be derived
from other desires for auditing or auditors to
achieve certain objectives. The paper also examines
whether expectations about auditing might be
derived from a consideration of the meaning of
‘auditing’. It is suggested that definitions of
‘auditing’ may themselves result from wanting to
achieve certain ends or objectives in auditing
situations. It is suggested that the ‘expectations
gap’ may be reconfigured by eliminating the
reference to expectations and treating the issues as
involving either beliefs and/or desires of the kind
identified. Clarifying the nature of expectations in
this way will facilitate greater clarity in discussion
of the expectations gap and more meaningful
argument about the grounds for these expectations.
The paper ends with speculation that the failure
to distinguish different kinds of expectation might
have arisen because the auditing profession
chooses to mask disagreements about what is
wanted from auditing by treating them as though
they arise from beliefs about the nature of
auditing.
1. THE ‘EXPECTATIONS GAP’
The objective of this paper is to undertake a
conceptual enquiry into the idea of an expectations
gap in auditing. It examines the meaning of the
expression ‘expectations gap’ and elucidates the
nature of expectations. Corporate collapses such
as Enron and WorldCom are often followed by a
chorus of blame. Auditors are castigated for not
having warned shareholders and other interested
parties about the precarious financial position of
the companies that have failed or for failing to
detect frauds that contributed to the collapse.
Questions like ‘Why did the auditors not warn us
that the company was not a going concern?’ or
‘Why did the auditors not detect fraud?’ are asked.
It is clear from these questions the auditor was
expected to discover going concern problems or the
fraud during their audit. The fact that the auditors
do not meet these expectations gives rise to
‘concern’ about auditing that is expressed through
the ‘notion of the “audit expectations gap” ’
(Humphrey, 1997, p. 3). The gap has a long history
fuelled by such financial scandals (Humphrey
et al., 1992a, p. 6). It is ‘one of the most serious
issues facing auditing practitioners and regulators
today’ (Humphrey et al., 1992a, p. 1). Unfortunately,
although the term ‘audit expectations gap’ remains
in common usage it is ‘relatively ill-defined and
can be taken to cover a variety of facets of the
relationship between auditors and other groups’
(Humphrey et al., 1992a, p. 2).1 A conceptual
enquiry examines the use of the expression
‘expectations gap’ in order to identify this ‘variety
of facets’ and to suggest a different way of
characterizing it. The meaning of the expression is
explored by asking the question ‘what do you
expect?’. The point of the question is not to identify
specific expectations. This is well explored in the
empirical work relating to the expectations gap.
The question is designed to elucidate the meaning
of the expression ‘expectations gap’. The issues that
are raised in the debate can be properly addressed
only if the nature of the expectations is understood
and the reasons for these expectations explored.
The paper begins by explaining what is involved
in a conceptual enquiry and why it is important
to undertake such an enquiry. This constitutes the
method of the paper. A conceptual enquiry is then
undertaken into how the expression ‘expectations
gap’ is understood in the literature. It considers
explanations of the expression and how the
expression is used in the literature. The nature of
expectations is examined with some help from
philosophy. The idea that expectations are beliefs is
explored. Reasons for such beliefs are considered.
The grounds for beliefs include believing that
auditors will do something because it is a duty
of auditors to undertake certain auditing
procedures and to demonstrate certain qualities in
their performance. Another characterization of
expectations as desires is then examined. These
constitute the reasons why regulators establish
duties that auditors are required to discharge.
The reasons for wanting auditors to perform
certain duties and the idea that such desires are
reasonable are examined. The paper ends with a
reconfiguration of the audit expectations gap based
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on the analysis of the kinds of expectations
identified in the paper.
2. CONCEPTUAL ENQUIRY
In modern philosophy a conceptual enquiry is
understood as an enquiry into the meaning of
words or expressions. A ‘descriptive conceptual
enquiry’ in accounting looks at ‘how accountants
use their terms’ (Lyas, 1993). A conceptual enquiry
answers questions about expressions such as ‘do
they have a precise meaning? Are they consistently
used? Are they ambiguous?’ (Lyas, 1993, p. 156). It
is a form of philosophical enquiry. Lyas argues that
‘any discipline which uses concepts, including
accounting, will have a philosophical dimension’
and that ‘no discipline worth bothering about
can seek to evade such conceptual enquiries’. They
‘constitute the hygiene of the reasoning of a
discipline. Without them we are prey to the loose,
the ambiguous, and the down-right slovenly’ (Lyas,
1993, p. 156). The nature of conceptual enquiry is
further explained by Dennis (2008).
This paper undertakes a descriptive conceptual
enquiry into the expression ‘expectations gap’. It
examines the use of this expression by those who
debate, discuss and write about the subject. The
reason why such an enquiry is important is
suggested by Wittgenstein. He once observed that
‘concepts lead us to make investigations; are the
expression of our interest, and direct our interest’
(Wittgenstein, 1958, §570). Our interest can also be
misdirected by concepts. Sterling draws attention
to ‘philosophers’ appreciation of the connection of
clarity of language to clarity of thought (and
communication)’ and suggests that ‘accountants
seem to lack such appreciation and the result is the
perpetuation of a number of errors and fallacies
that can be traced to linguistic turbidity’ (Sterling,
1993, p. 127).
In the observation that the term ‘expectations
gap’ is ‘ill-defined’ noted above, Humphrey
suggests that problems of ‘linguistic turbidity’ may
have infected discussions about the expectations
gap. If the expression ‘expectations gap’ is not
consistently used and if different people mean
something different by the expression then
communication and debate is undermined. The
expression is vague. This means that there is
‘in the practice of its application, significant
disagreements about what uses of it are correct’
(Baker & Hacker, 1980, p. 218). The consequences
of this are that it is difficult to agree on the truth
of empirical statements about expectations or to
debate different expectations since people mean
different things by these expressions. The paper
explores the extent to which this is the case.
Vagueness can be eliminated through an
‘evaluative conceptual enquiry’. The use of the
expression ‘expectations gap’ is evaluated in
the sense that the usefulness of the concept in
the auditing context is questioned. A further
‘prescriptive conceptual enquiry’ might then go on
to reject certain meanings or concepts on the
grounds that they are not useful and to propose a
preferred meaning. The term might be abandoned
if the confusion in its use cannot easily be remedied
(Dennis, 2008). These kinds of enquiry make sense
if language is conceived of as ‘naturalistic’. This
view was adopted by Wittgenstein who argues that
concepts emerge within a context. To understand
the meaning of any term is to grasp ‘those human
interests, needs and practices in the context of
which it arose and into which it fits’ (Lyas, 1993,
p. 163). If the context is a particular society then it
follows that meanings are ‘socially constructed’
and ‘depend on human agreement’ (Searle, 1995,
p. 2). A conceptual enquiry can hopefully influence
meanings in order the make the expressions or
concepts more useful. This is the justification for
undertaking such an enquiry.
3. A DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPTUAL
ENQUIRY INTO ‘EXPECTATIONS
GAP’
The literature on the expectations gap is ‘extensive,
ranging for example, from empirical and
experimental research to ascertain beliefs about
auditing and its effects on the decision of particular
groups to analysis of legal judgement and to the
work of various professional and governmental
investigations established to consider audit related
issues’ (Humphrey et al., 1993, p. 395). The paper
does not pretend to examine all of this literature.
It is mainly concerned with the current use of the
expression ‘expectations gap’ and is interested in
the historical literature only in so far as this
provides some insight into the current usage of the
term. It is not meant to provide a complete ‘history
of concept formation’ or to review all of the
previous uses of the term. The current debate about
auditing expectations is ‘directed’ by the current
understanding of the expression. Historical uses
of the expression play a part in determining such
understanding. Indeed, ‘the issues incorporated
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within the term “audit expectations gap” (such as
auditors’ fraud detection responsibilities, auditor
independence, public interest reporting and the
meaning of auditors’ communications) have
remained very similar since its emergence in the
1970s, and, indeed have a history that is as long as
company auditing itself’ (Humphrey et al., 1992a,
p. 5). If the issues are the same then the kind of
thing that is understood by the term ‘expectations
gap’ would not appear to have changed.
The use of the expression ‘expectations gap’ is
common in current discussions of regulators,
preparers of financial statements, the profession
and academics. However, it is characterized in
different ways and the nature of the expectations is
not always clear. The President of the International
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) recently stated
that ‘despite the audit reforms of the past five
years, I believe an expectation gap still exists
between what an audit actually is, and what
investors and other stakeholders think it should be’
(IFAC, 2007, p. 6). This sounds like a definitional
issue about the meaning of ‘audit’ but it might
also indicate beliefs about what auditors do in the
context of an audit or what actually occurs in an
audit. Alternatively what stakeholders ‘think it
should be’ might be interpreted as a matter of what
they want auditors to do. It is thus not clear
whether expectations are beliefs, facts or desires.
The ‘gap’ might be between the beliefs or desires
that one party has and the beliefs and desires that
another party has, or between a belief and the facts
that make the belief true or false. The Auditing
Practices Board (APB) refers to their own work on
proposals for expanding the auditor report as being
‘intended to address that aspect of the expectations
gap that arose because users of auditor’s reports
did not understand the scope and nature of the
audit’ (APB, 2007, p. 10). The reference to
understanding suggests that the users may have
false beliefs about what an audit involves. The
ICAEW Audit Quality Forum, which includes
representatives of auditors, investors and business
and regulatory bodies, recognizes that ‘there are
expectations gaps between what some stakeholders
want or believe to be the purpose of the audit
and what auditors are providing to existing
shareholders by way of assurance’ (ICAEW, 2006a,
p. 5). Reference is made here to both beliefs and
desires and also to facts that render the beliefs true
or false. It might be understood as indicating a
‘gap’ between what is desired and whether that
desire is fulfilled or not. The current syllabuses of
the Professional Stage examinations of the ICAEW
include the requirement to consider ‘the gap
between outcomes delivered by audit engagements
and the expectations of users of audit reports’
(ICAEW, 2006b). Here there is reference to facts but
it is not clear whether the expectations are beliefs
about the audit report or desires about what it
should contain.
It is not surprising that there is a diversity of
meanings in the current usage of the expression
‘expectations gap’. A similar diversity is evident in
historical uses of the term (Humphrey et al., 1992a,
1992b; Humphrey, 1997). In summary the gap is
‘a representation of the feeling that auditors are
performing in a manner at variance with the beliefs
and desires of those for whose benefit the audit is
being carried out’ (Humphrey, 1997, p. 9). It is not
surprising that current talk about the expectations
gap refers to a gap in beliefs, desires and facts given
the historical uses of the expression.
Humphrey analyses the expectations gap as ‘a
role-perception gap, leading to comparisons of the
views of shareholders . . . regarding the role of the
audit with a predetermined, sometimes legalistic
notion of what can reasonably be expected of
auditors (or with what auditors believe should be
expected of them)’ (Humphrey, 1997, p. 9). There
are a number of different ways in which this could
be understood. A gap might arise between what
shareholders believe auditors do and what they are
required to do by law. This is a gap between beliefs
and facts that make the belief true or false. It might
relate to what shareholders believe auditors do and
what auditors believe that they are required to do
by law, that is, a gap between different beliefs.
It might also relate to a gap between what
shareholders want auditors to do and what
auditors want to do. These different ‘expectations’
are conflated in the idea of a ‘performance gap’.
This is explained as a difference between ‘what
society can reasonably expect auditors to
accomplish and what they are perceived to achieve’
(Porter, 1993, p. 50). It is not clear though whether
the ‘perception’ of shareholders regarding the role
of auditors is a belief about what auditors do or a
desire that they perform some role.
The reference to what can ‘reasonably’ be
expected of auditors cannot really be understood
unless it is clear whether the expectation is a belief
that is reasonable or a desire that is reasonable. If
the expectation is a belief then it is appropriate to
talk about an ‘ignorance gap’. The answer to such a
gap is to educate the recipients of audit services as
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to what it is reasonable to expect from an audit. A
belief is reasonable if it is based on fact. If the gap is
not in beliefs but in desires then the response that
addresses ignorance is inadequate. Arguing about
beliefs is different from arguing about desires. This
is explored further below.
If the nature of the expectations is not agreed
then arguments between parties about them might
be at cross purposes. A gap in desires should be
addressed by considering the arguments for or
against conflicting desires. Whether the desires
are reasonable or not depends upon the
‘reasonableness’ of the reasons for wanting
auditors to do something or for believing that
something is the case. If they are not reasonable
there might be a ‘reasonableness gap’. This has
been explained as a gap ‘between what society
expects auditors to achieve and what they can
reasonably be expected to accomplish’ (Porter,
1993, p. 50). However, unless it is clear whether
the expectation is one of belief or of desire, then
the nature of the ‘reasonableness gap’ hangs in the
air because the nature of the reasons for the
‘expectation’ is not clear.
There may be concerns about ‘the adequacy of
current professional auditing standards and the
quality of auditors’ service delivery’ (Humphrey,
1997, p. 9). Two separate issues are conflated in this
description of the expectations gap. It might be that
current auditing standards are inadequate because
they do not require auditors to do something that
someone else wants them to do. This might be
called a ‘deficient standards gap’ and could be
explained as ‘a gap between the duties which can
reasonably be expected of auditors and auditors’
existing duties as defined by the law and
professional promulgations’ (Porter, 1993, p. 50).
The reference to ‘reasonable’ suggests that the gap
is not just in what is wanted by different parties but
that there may be a gap in reasons for wanting it.
It might also be that auditors do not follow the
standards adequately in delivering their service. If
it is a matter of fact as to what the existing duties
actually are, then is this a gap between desires
and reality? The latter might be called a
‘deficient performance gap’. This might be
explained as ‘a gap between the expected standards
of performance of auditors’ existing duties and
auditors’ perceived performance, as expected and
perceived by society’. This gap might involve
perceptions about the quality of auditors’ work
(Humphrey et al., 1992a, p. 2). Once again, this can
be understood as either a gap in beliefs about
the actual quality of their work or in desires that
they perform them in a certain way. These are
sometimes lumped together in talking about the
‘ “expectations” controversy over the social role of
auditors’ (Gaa, 1991, p. 85). Having expectations
about the ‘social role of auditors’ might be
understood as beliefs or desires about role or
quality.
Sikka et al. explain the gap as a difference in
objectives. It is the gap ‘between what the public
expects from an audit’ and ‘what the auditing
profession prefers the audit objectives to be’ (Sikka
et al., 1998, p. 299). The importance of clarifying
the objectives of auditing was emphasized by Lee
(1970) even before the term ‘expectations gap’
relating to auditing was first used. He pointed to
‘lack of real understanding of the auditor and his
work’ that is apparent in some criticism of the audit
function that is made following audit scandals
(Lee, 1970, p. 292). The public might ‘expect’
auditors to do something because they believe that
they are required to do it. If this is the case then it
is not appropriate to talk about a gap between
this and what the auditing profession ‘prefers’ the
audit objectives to be. This is a matter of what the
profession wants the regulator to require them to
do, not about what they believe that they have to
do. It is not a gap in beliefs but a gap between
beliefs and desires. If this is what is meant then
it is as inappropriate to talk of a ‘gap’ as to talk
of a ‘gap’ between chalk and cheese. It would be
appropriate to talk about a gap if there was a
difference between what the public want auditors
to do and what auditors want auditors to do or
between what the public believe auditors do and
what auditors believe they do.
These different understandings suggest that the
terms are vague. Some help in understanding
the nature of ‘expectations’ can be derived from
philosophical sources.
4. EXPECTATION
The expressions used to describe the expectations
gap such as ‘X expects that . . .’, ‘X believes that . . .’,
‘X desires that . . .’, etc. are known, following the
terminology of the philosopher Bertrand Russell,
as statements about propositional attitudes (Wolfram,
1989, p. 70). Propositional attitudes report that
a person X has a certain attitude designated by
the expression that precedes ‘that’ towards a
proposition that follows ‘that’. The proposition is
not asserted in the sense that the truth of the
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statement that someone has a propositional attitude
does not depend upon the truth of the embedded
proposition (Wolfram, 1989, p. 139). For example, it
may be true that someone believes that cats can fly
even though the proposition ‘cats can fly’ is false.
Similarly, it might be true that someone expects
something of auditors without it being the case that
auditors actually do what is expected.
In ordinary language the word ‘expectation’ or
‘expects’ implies that the ‘expectation is unsatisfied,
because it is the expectation of something’
(Wittgenstein, 1958, §438). If something is expected
then it is yet to happen. In an example that
Wittgenstein uses, a person might say ‘I see
someone pointing a gun and say “I expect a
report”. The shot is fired.’ (Wittgenstein, 1958,
§442). The expectation might be re-expressed as ‘I
expect that an explosive noise will occur when the
trigger is pulled’. The event of pulling the trigger or
firing the shot has not yet happened. Expectations
like the one about the report of the gun are really
beliefs about the future. Given that the sentence that
follows ‘that’ when an expectation is expressed is
not a description of an event that has happened,
this sentence is neither true nor false. What is true
or false is that someone has the expectation in
question. There may be a ‘gap’ in expectations
where someone has an expectation or belief and
someone else does not have the same expectation
or belief. A different kind of gap exists where
someone has an expectation and yet what is
expected does not happen. If what is expected does
happen then the expectation is fulfilled. A sentence
that describes the event becomes true. If not, then
the expectation has not been met. If someone
expects something to happen and it does not
happen, then this might be described as a ‘gap’ in
expectations. This only means that a belief that
some event will occur in the future turns out to be
false.
In the descriptions of the expectations gap
considered in the descriptive conceptual enquiry
above, both of these kinds of gaps were referred to.
There may be a gap between what one party expects
auditors to do and what another party expects
auditors to do, that is, a gap in the propositional
attitudes of the two parties. If the expectation is a
belief about what will happen then one party has
such a belief and another party does not have such
a belief. It might also be the case that what is
expected to happen in an audit is different from what
actually happens. This might be described as a ‘gap’,
but it is not a gap in propositional attitudes but
between the belief expressed in the embedded
sentence and certain facts about what happens.
Both of these ‘gaps’ are evident in one example
from the expectations gap literature concerning
the expectations relating to the auditors’ role in
detecting fraud. Arguments about ‘the extent of
auditors’ responsibility for detecting and
preventing fraud’ have a long history. It has
received ‘arguably, as much attention in the 1890s
as it has done in the 1990s’ (Chandler & Edwards,
1996, p. 12). There is a long history of differences
of opinion between jurists and auditors and also
among them as to the role of auditors in detecting
fraud (Teo & Cobbin, 2005). Similar differences
are evident in more recent empirical work on
the expectations gap. This suggests that ‘the issue
of fraud detection is likely to remain a source of
debate’ (Humphrey et al., 1992a, p. 36). This
expectation might be expressed by a sentence
uttered by an interested party ‘I expect that
auditors of company X will detect fraud during
their audit’. The kinds of fraud that auditors are
expected to detect, whether all fraud or all material
fraud or employee or senior management frauds,
can be further specified. If the expectation is of the
belief kind, it might also be expressed as ‘I believe
that auditors of company X will detect fraud during
their audit’. Where some parties have such a belief
and others do not then there is a ‘gap’ in beliefs,
that is, in the propositional attitude. One party has
the belief and another party does not.
If parties have different beliefs then it is
important to investigate the grounds or reasons
for having such beliefs. In Wittgenstein’s example,
someone might expect a ‘report’ because they are
aware of what guns are and know, from past
experience, what happens when a gun is fired.
Expectations that are beliefs about what will happen
might be based on beliefs about what has happened.
Exploring a reason for a belief is a matter of looking
at the reasoning to the belief. As Wittgenstein
points out, the concept of a reason is related to that of
reasoning (Hacker, 1996, p. 58). Giving reasons for
believing is a matter of expressing premises that
are believed and that are used in reasoning to a
conclusion that is also believed. In the case of an
expectation of this kind, the belief amounts to a
prediction that something will happen. Justifying a
belief or prediction about something that has not
happened is a matter of giving reasons or grounds
for believing that it will occur. What kind of
reasons and reasoning might justify an expectation
of the belief kind?
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It may be based on inductive reasoning where
a conclusion that something will occur is based on
premises about what has occurred in the past
(Gillies, 1993, pp. 8–11). If the auditors of company
X have always been observed to detect fraud in the
past, then they might be expected to do so in the
future. The belief about what auditors will do
might be based on what other auditors have done.
They might believe a universal generalization that
all auditors detect fraud. This is unlikely given that
there are clear instances in the past where
particular auditors have failed to detect fraud in
prominent cases of corporate collapse. Given these
cases, it is unlikely that anyone actually believes
such a universal generalization. It is clearly false.
They might believe a statistical statement to the
effect that most auditors detect fraud might
constitute a reason for believing that the auditors of
Company X will do so.
The expectations gap might be characterized as a
difference in beliefs about the actions of particular
auditors. One party might believe that the auditors
of Company X will detect fraud and another party
might believe that they will not. However, the
expectations gap issues are not normally specified
at this level of particularity. Expectations are
characterized more generally. Although particular
lapses in the detection of fraud by auditors are cited
as evidence of a failure in expectations, what is
really at issue is the generalization, that is, the
grounds for particular beliefs. This is why
characterizing the issues as an expectation is
misleading. The beliefs about auditors are not just
related to the future. Some of the gaps arise because
of different beliefs about what auditors generally
do, in the past and present as well as in the future.
Some party might believe that auditors generally
detect fraud and another party might not believe it.
If the expectations gap arises through acceptance
of a statistical generalization, it is difficult to see
why evidence that particular auditors fail to detect
fraud should be taken by anyone to support or
undermine the belief in the generalization. After
all, although the statistical generalization states that
most auditors detect fraud, it also implies that not
all auditors do so. If particular auditors do not do
so then this is to be expected. It is only if it happens
often that the statistical generalization is refuted.
Although differences in beliefs about what auditors
will do might result from different parties either
accepting or rejecting statistical statements, there
is some empirical evidence that the expectation is
based on a belief about the duties of auditors.
5. DUTIES OF AUDITORS
Humphrey et al. state ‘a number of interviewees
took the statutory provisions contained in the
Companies Acts as their starting point for
describing the function of auditing’ and ‘this
legalistic approach was certainly apparent in the
views of many of those involved in regulatory
functions as well as the lawyers interviewed’
(Humphrey et al., 1992a, p. 32). This suggests that
the reason parties have for believing that auditors
will detect fraud is not based on beliefs in statistical
statements derived from experience about what
auditors have done in the past, but on a belief that
fraud detection is a duty of auditors coupled with
a belief that auditors will do their duty. Porter
uses statute law, case law and professional
promulgations to identify the duties of auditors
and then asks the respondents to state whether
or not it is an existing duty (Porter, 1993, p. 50).
Getting respondents to identify duties of auditors
suggests that researchers assume that people who
have expectations about auditors base these
expectations on beliefs about the duty of auditors.
If the expectation that auditors will do something
is of the belief kind then believing that a particular
procedure is a duty of auditors may constitute
a ground for expecting or believing that they will
do it. Someone with this belief may reason as
follows:
Premise 1: I believe that X is a duty of auditors.
Premise 2: I believe that auditors always do their
duty.
Conclusion: I believe that auditors will do X.
Someone else might reason differently. They may
have different beliefs about whether X is a duty
of auditors or whether auditors always do their
duty. There may be a ‘gap’ in these beliefs in the
sense that one person may believe something and
another person may not believe it. As a result they
may end up with different beliefs, that is, may draw
a different conclusion about what auditors will do
in an audit. In other words, premise 1 is not agreed.
There is plenty of empirical evidence that beliefs
about the duties of auditors are mistaken. In earlier
research, Lee asked three audit oriented groups,
auditors, auditees and audit beneficiaries, about a
range of audit ‘objectives’ that ‘have been either
advocated, prescribed, accepted or rejected as
company audit objectives during the last eighty
years or so’ (Lee, 1970, p. 295). Lee seems to use the
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term ‘objectives’ to mean things like expressing
an opinion on whether financial statements give a
true and fair view, detecting fraud and compliance
with legal requirements. The difference between
objectives and duties is only that ‘objectives’ are
more general. These general duties might be
contrasted with more specific duties to perform
certain procedures that will result in fulfilling the
general ones. Lee concludes that ‘the viewpoints
expressed by professional and industrial
accountants were surprisingly ill-formed’ (Lee,
1970, p. 295). This conclusion is confirmed by more
current research that asks about a wider range
of tasks. Auditees, financial and non-financial
community audit beneficiaries were found to be
mistaken in their beliefs about the duties of
auditors. The non-financial community audit
beneficiaries ‘considered auditors’ duties to be far
more extensive than were actually required’ (Porter
& Gowthorpe, 2004, p. 19). Rectifying a mistake of
this kind, that is, an ‘ignorance gap’, is a matter
of educating such parties about the duties of
auditors.
A failure to agree on the conclusion might also
result from accepting or not accepting premise 2.
This appears to be a belief about an empirical
statement, a generalization about what auditors
always do, namely, their duty. Given audit scandals
like Enron, it seems unlikely that anyone would
accept premise 2 as it stands. Auditors do not
always do their duty. It is more likely that interested
parties only accept a statistical statement of the kind
‘I believe that auditors almost always do their duty’.
If this is the case the conclusion would not be as
stated above but as ‘I believe that auditors will
almost always do X’. A belief of this kind is not
undermined by the occasional failure of auditors to
do their duty. As with statistical statements above,
this is entirely to be expected.
Even with this change from a universal to a
statistical generalization it is unlikely that
interested parties actually argue like this.
Something may be a duty of auditors, but unless
auditors are aware that it is a duty then they will
not do it. What is needed is another premise,
namely ‘I believe that auditors always do what they
believe to be their duty’. The trouble is that the
reasoning to a belief about what auditors will do
becomes unsound if premise 2 is altered. What is
needed is the addition of another premise for the
argument above to go through:
Premise 1: I believe that X is a duty of auditors.
Premise 2(a): I believe that if X is a duty of
auditors then auditors will believe that it is their
duty.
Premise 2: I believe that auditors always do what
they believe to be their duty.
Conclusion: I believe that auditors will do X.
There is plenty of empirical evidence that auditors
do not always believe that something is their duty
even if it is their duty. Empirical work from the
time of Lee (1970) to Porter & Gowthorpe (2004)
shows that auditors sometimes fail to recognize
existing duties. Lee observed that ‘it is extremely
disappointing to see accountants, and especially
auditors, displaying beliefs about auditing as
apparently mistaken as some of those expressed by
so-called laymen’ (Lee, 1970, p. 296). More recently
the auditor group failed to recognize ‘seven of their
existing duties’ (Porter & Gowthorpe, 2004, p. 14).
This shows that the belief in premise 2(a) is false.
This may be an ‘ignorance gap’ in that beliefs may
be false, but it is one that affects auditors as well as
other interested parties.
If auditors do not believe that something is their
duty, even if it actually is their duty, the effect will
be that they will not end up doing their duty. The
assumption here is that auditors act for reasons and
these reasons involve beliefs about what is their
duty. Auditors reason as follows:
I want to do my duty.
I believe that X is my duty.
Therefore, I want to do X.
They may then go on to act because they want to
do X. They end up doing their duty. If they do not
believe X is their duty then they do not conclude
that they want to do X and, therefore, they do not
end up doing X. What this shows is if the auditor
has a different belief as to what their duty is from
that of some other party, then the belief that an
auditor will do X most of the time is likely to be
false. There is a gap between the belief and reality.
What this shows is that differences in beliefs
about what is a duty of auditors can result in a
‘gap’ in beliefs about what auditors will do but
also to a ‘gap’ between the belief and the reality.
It is no wonder that the literature on the
expectations gap sometimes characterizes the gap
in terms of a gap in propositional attitudes, in the
belief itself, but also a gap between beliefs and
reality.
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If expectations are beliefs then the expectations
gap might be characterized as a gap between:
(i) beliefs of various parties in statistical
generalizations about what auditors mostly
do
(ii) beliefs of various parties about what is the
duty of auditors
(iii) a belief about what will happen and what
happens in reality.
The beliefs in (i) might be based on the beliefs in (ii)
in so far as the parties believe that auditors mostly
do something is based on a belief that it is their
duty to do so and that auditors mostly do their
duty. If auditors have different beliefs about
their duties then they may end up not doing what
they are believed to mostly do and (iii) arises as a
result.
Characterizing the expectations gap as gap in
beliefs suggests that it is an ‘ignorance gap’. If the
belief that X is a duty of auditors is mistaken then
the parties, including auditors, can be educated by
explaining what is required of auditors by law or
professional regulation. Lee suggests ‘in order to
fully appreciate what the company auditor is doing
on their behalf, shareholders – and, for that matter,
other users of the accounts – must know what the
detailed objectives of the audit are. This knowledge
and understanding can only come from well
defined and adequately communicated statements
describing the appropriate audit objectives of the
day’ (1970, p. 292). This should deal with false
beliefs in premise 1. If auditors do not grasp their
duties then they too can be educated in what their
duties are. This should assist in making the belief
in premise 2(a) true. If auditors believe that
something is their duty and they want to do their
duty, then they should end up doing their duty for
the most part and there will not be a gap between
belief and reality. If this is done then the
expectations gap should disappear.
This sounds rather too good to be true. The issues
raised by the gap may not arise solely because of
beliefs about what the duties of auditors actually
are. It may be that the gap is also about what the
auditors’ duties should be. It may be that it is
‘something more than a communication problem’
(Humphrey et al., 1992a, p. 8). The expectations
about fraud detection ‘may be expressing wider
ethical beliefs about business and audit’
(Humphrey et al., 1992a, p. 36). In fact, it would be
more accurate not to talk in terms of beliefs,
whether ‘ethical’ or not, but to talk instead about
what is wanted from auditing. The propositional
attitude that is referred to as an expectation may not
be a belief about what auditors will do or about
their duties, but a desire that auditors do something
or that something becomes a duty of auditors.
Bridging the expectations gap is not just a matter of
dealing with the reasons for believing that auditors
will do something or that something is a duty, but
of considering reasons for wanting auditors to do
something or for something to be made a duty.
6. EXPECTATIONS AS DESIRES
In ordinary uses of the term ‘expects’ the
propositional attitude is not necessarily a belief but
might be understood, at least in part, as a desire.
There is an interesting example from history.
Admiral Nelson communicated an expectation to
his fleet before the Battle of Trafalgar. Using flags
he signalled to his ships ‘England expects that
every man will do his duty’. Is this expectation
a belief? Apparently, Nelson originally wanted
his signal officer to send the message ‘England
confides [=has confidence that] every man will do
his duty’ (Wikipedia, 2008). This suggests that
Nelson’s expectation was in the nature of a belief,
but did he really believe that every man would do
their duty or merely that most men would do so?
The actual message sent replaced ‘confides’ with
‘expects’. This was done because in the signal book
the word ‘confides’ would have to be spelled out
letter-by-letter whereas there was a single symbol
for ‘expects’ (Wikipedia, 2008). The change saved
time, but also altered the meaning. The message
sent conveys not only the fact that it is believed that
at least most men will do their duty, but it also
expresses the hope or desire that the proposition
becomes true. It is thus an expression not only of
belief but also of a desire.
Some of the statements of expectations by those
who participate in the expectations gap discussions
might also be interpreted as expressions of desires
as well as, or instead of, beliefs. The statement
‘shareholders expect that most auditors will detect
fraud’ might be interpreted as a belief about
what auditors generally do, perhaps based on a
belief that it is their duty to do so, but might also
be interpreted as an expression of a desire that
auditors should have such a duty. These
expectations might be more perspicuously
expressed by stating that ‘shareholders believe that
it is a duty of auditors to detect fraud’ and/or that
‘shareholders want auditors to detect fraud’. How
it is to be interpreted would be revealed by how the
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expectation is justified. What kind of premises and
what kind of reasoning are used in giving reasons
for or justifying such expectations? Reasoning to
a belief that auditors will do something might
be based on premises about duties of the kind
indicated above. This is different from the kind of
reasoning that justifies or explains a desire. This is
practical reasoning.
7. PRACTICAL REASONING
Practical reasoning is often explained in the
philosophical literature in the context of explaining
what is involved in giving reasons for intentional
actions (Anscombe, 1957). Explaining an action is
a matter of showing that the action follows from
certain premises in accordance with practical
reasoning. A reason for an action ‘rationalizes an
action if it leads us to see something the agent saw,
or thought he saw, in his action – some feature,
consequence, or aspect of the action the agent
wanted, desired, prized, held dear, thought dutiful,
beneficial, obligatory, or agreeable’ (Davidson,
1980, p. 3). They can be subsumed under the broad
idea that the action was wanted or desired. This does
not have the implication that it was ‘intense or
emotion-laden’ (Goldman, 1970, p. 49). Part of the
reason expresses a desire or objective that is to be
achieved by the action in question. The other
constituent of a reason is a belief that states that the
action in question will fulfil the desire or objective.
The pair is called the primary reason, or reason for
short, why the agent performed the action
(Davidson, 1980, p. 4). Practical reasoning includes
a premise that expresses a desire and a premise that
expresses a belief. It concludes with an intention to
act in a certain way. An example of such reasoning
would be of the form:
I want Y
I believe that doing X will fulfil Y
I will do X.
This was the kind of reasoning described above
whereby auditors were taken to reason from a
desire to do their duty and a belief that something
is their duty to a desire to do what is their duty.
The reasons explain why they performed certain
intentional actions in the context of their audit.
This kind of reasoning is also known in the
accounting literature as ‘instrumental reasoning’
or ‘conditional-normative reasoning’ (Mattessich,
1995) or as ‘means-end reasoning’ (Archer, 1993).
Although the conclusion is expressed as an
intention to perform an action, it actually expresses
a desire to perform an action. Practical reasoning
should really be understood as reasoning from
desires and beliefs to another desire. In the case of
actions it is a desire to act. The conclusion ‘I will
do/intend to do X’ might be expressed as ‘I want to
do X’. If the act follows, this is because it is wanted.
This is a different kind of explanation than giving
reasons for wanting to do something. It might be
interpreted as explaining the action that follows by
stating that the cause of the action is the fact that
someone wants to perform the action. Even if
someone wants to perform an action, they may not
do so. This may be because they are physically
prevented from doing so. It may also be because
they want to do something else more than they
want to do X.
If an expectation is understood as a desire then
an expectation gap might arise if one party desires
something that another party does not. Arguing
about expectations would be arguing about
reasons for wanting to do something. In practical
reasoning these reasons are the expression of a
desire for something other than the action and a
belief that performing the action in question will
fulfil the desire. If someone believes that
performing an action will result in the fulfilment
of this other desire then evidence for this belief can
be disputed. If the belief follows from some
generalization then the generalization can be
disputed. To take an example, an accountant may
argue that they want to audit the books of Company
A because they want to earn a living and believe that
Company A will pay them for auditing their books.
The belief that Company A will pay an auditor for
auditing their books might be disputed by pointing
out that Company A never pays its auditors.
Arguing about desires is less easy to understand. If
there is a disagreement about the desire premise
then is any further argument possible? Is it not
simply a brute fact that one person wants
something that another person does not want?
Although this might be the case, there are plenty
of instances where it is possible to argue about
desires. There may be further reasons for the desire
in question. In the same example above, someone
may question why the auditor wants to earn a
living. This is unlikely because most people already
understand that this is something desirable.
However, if this was not agreed then the auditor
might argue that they want to be able to pay for
their children’s schooling and believe that by
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earning a living this will be possible. These reasons
are set out in further practical reasoning where from
the desire to pay for schooling and the belief that
earning a living will make this possible the desire
to earn a living follows.
It was assumed in the practical reasoning of an
auditor above that desires that underpin auditing
actions are desires of auditors to do their duty. If
auditors want to do their duty and believe that
something is a duty of auditors then they might
conclude that they want to do that thing. They may
want to do their duty simply because they accept
the obligation or because they do not want the
opprobrium of being seen not to observe the law or
professional regulations. If they do not do their
duty they may be excluded from the profession or
find themselves subject to charges of negligence
where doing what the profession requires is a
criterion of not being negligent. These may all
constitute reasons for wanting to do their duty.
Where an accountant follows a rule because it
is required by an institution, it is still the case
that they want to do their duty. The practice of
following the rule can be called an institutional
practice where it is done because following the rule
is required by an institution whose authority is
accepted. Auditing is an institutional practice in
this sense. Auditors follow the rules in auditing
standards, that is, accept that they have a duty to
follow them, because they accept the authority of
the standard setter. In some jurisdictions the
practice of following rules for auditing might be a
legal practice. This means that the reason why a rule
is followed and a duty observed is that it is
required by the law.
If one party wants something to be a duty of
auditors, and institutions or legislatures do not,
then the argument is not with auditors themselves
but with the institutions or the legislatures that
determine the duties of auditors. Of course,
practising auditors may get involved with
arguments about what should be their duty
through their professional bodies. Unlike the
expectations gap between the beliefs of non-
auditors and those of auditors about what is a
duty of auditors, the gap is between non-auditors
and standard setters or the legislature about what
the latter should require as a duty of auditors.
Arguing about duties is a matter of looking at the
reasons why institutions or the legislature want or
do not want auditors to do certain things and at
why other people want auditors to perform certain
duties. The desires that prompt institutions or the
legislature to promulgate rules about auditing
might be described as objectives they have for the
practice of auditing. The rules are believed to be a
means of achieving these objectives. They are not
objectives in the sense of some of Lee’s objectives.
They are not duties but are ends that will be
achieved by auditors performing certain duties.
Institutions or the legislature might go through
the following kind of practical reasoning:
I (=institutions/the legislature) want auditors to
achieve objectives Y
I believe that promulgating regulation/law X
will achieve these objectives
I want to promulgate regulation/law X
Arguing about what is wanted may involve
considering reasons for wanting certain objectives
expressed in the first premise. This involves further
practical reasoning from other desires and beliefs
about how these other desires will be fulfilled. It
may also consider the second premise and dispute
reasons for believing that certain regulations/laws
will achieve these desires.
There is plenty of empirical evidence that some
parties want auditors to perform certain duties
that they are not at the moment required to do.
Porter and Gowthorpe identify 46 responsibilities
that ‘society’ expects auditors to perform of
which only 13 are existing responsibilities of audi-
tors. These expectations were identified by asking
respondents about what responsibilities auditors
‘should perform’ (Porter & Gowthorpe, 2004). This
question amounts to asking respondents about the
duties they want auditors to perform. Non-auditors
may disagree about what they want. This may be
because of differences in the reasons that each party
has for wanting something to be a duty of auditors.
The gap in duties might be called a ‘duty gap’. The
gap in reasons might be called a ‘reasons gap’. The
duty gap comes about as a result of a reasons gap.
The latter might be characterized as arising because
one party thinks the reasons are reasonable and
another party thinks that they are not. The ‘reasons
gap’ might be thought of as a ‘reasonableness gap’.
This distinction needs to be explored further.
8. REASONABLENESS
If regulators have reasons for wanting auditors to
follow a rule and promulgate such a rule then
it becomes a duty of auditors. Their reason for
wanting auditors to follow a rule might come
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under scrutiny by others. If the belief or desire that
together constitute this reason are not accepted
by others, then the rule might be said to be
unreasonable. Given that the reasons for wanting
something involve further desires and beliefs about
whether what is wanted will fulfil these desires,
then whether or not the reasons given are taken as
reasonable depends upon whether there is
agreement on these further desires and beliefs.
Agreement on reasonableness is agreement on
reasons.
Porter states that ‘in order for duties to be
reasonably expected of auditors they must be
cost-beneficial for auditors to perform’ (Porter,
1993, p. 62). This means that rules should be
promulgated, at least in part, only if they meet the
desire for the benefits of following the rule to
outweigh the costs associated with following it. It is
suggested that ‘it is logical that their performance
should be cost-beneficial’ (Porter & Gowthorpe,
2004, p. 38). In fact, there is nothing intrinsically
‘logical’ about the desire for the benefits of auditing
to outweigh costs. It is simply something that
is wanted and accepted as a reason for wanting
auditing procedures to be established as a duty for
auditors. The desire itself is not ‘logical’. Something
is logical only if it follows from premises in
accordance with rules of logic. If a conclusion
follows in accordance with the canons of practical
reasoning, then it is ‘logical’ to accept the
conclusion on the basis of accepting the premises.
The premise itself, the desire for benefits to
outweigh costs, is not itself logical. A premise
expressing a desire is acceptable if the desire is
accepted. Accepting a desire is a matter of either
accepting it as desirable in itself or having reasons
for wanting it of the kind that are expressed in
further practical reasoning. A premise expressing a
belief is acceptable if there is evidence for its truth.
If both premises are accepted and the reasoning is
sound then wanting to promulgate a standard is
reasonable.
Whether or not a particular regulation that sets
out a duty of auditors will fulfil a desire is an
empirical matter. It is not the kind of thing about
which agreement can be sought in general terms in
advance of the proposal to establish particular
duties. However, it is possible to agree in advance
on the desires that are acceptable and that
constitute reasons for the acceptance of a desire
to promulgate duties. The criterion proposed by
Porter of only accepting duties that are
cost-beneficial is fine as far as it goes. However,
to be operational the various parties who are
concerned must agree on what constitutes a benefit
and agree on the costs associated with it. They
must also agree on some method of weighing
the one against the other to establish that the
benefit outweighs the cost. Although costs might
be understood in terms of audit fees, what is to be
taken as a benefit? Porter avoids the problems
that might arise in identifying benefits by simply
accepting that the duties that can be ‘reasonably
expected’ are the duties expected by ‘auditees and
financial community audit beneficiaries’ (Porter,
1993, p. 62). The assumption is that that they are
motivated by cost-benefit considerations and so
whatever duties they want auditors to perform
will be cost-beneficial. This begs the question of
whether the cost-benefit criterion is the only
objective that is to be accepted in deciding on
duties. There is also the question of whether their
interpretation of something as a benefit coincides
with that of other interested parties. It also begs
the question of whether auditees and financial
community audit beneficiaries are motivated only
by such a criterion in deciding what duties are
wanted of auditors. What is required is some
agreement on what the objectives of auditing are or,
what is the same thing, an agreement on what is
wanted from auditing and auditors. This is necessary
if there is to be agreement on whether or not it
is reasonable to want auditors to have a certain
duty. If other groups want something different then
their desires are discounted and do not constitute
‘reasonable’ desires for the purpose of determining
the duties of auditors. Some agreement on
objectives is necessary if there is to be agreement on
reasonableness.
9. THE OBJECTIVES OF AUDITING
According to Sikka et al. (1998) and Power (1997)
there is no agreement on the objectives of auditing.
The expectations gap is said to arise because of a
disagreement about objectives. In so far as there is
a lack of agreement about why certain objectives
are wanted there is a ‘reasons gap’. The attempt to
achieve agreement about objectives in the context
of financial reporting was one of the motivations
for undertaking the project of developing a
conceptual framework for financial reporting. This
suggests that a way of bridging the ‘reasons gap’
is by undertaking a similar project for auditing.
Undertaking such a project was suggested by a
number of respondents in their comment letters on
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the Clarity Exposure Draft and Consultation Paper
issued by the InternationalAuditing andAssurance
Standards Board (IAASB) in September 2004 (see
comment letters of the International Organisation
of Securities Commission, KPMG and
PricewaterhouseCoopers in IAASB, 2005a).
Looking for reasons for auditing procedures is
also something explored in what has been called
a ‘theory of auditing’. A ‘theory’ in this context
is said to be a ‘number of basic assumptions and
a body of integrated ideas, the understanding
of which will be of direct assistance in the
development and practice of the art of auditing’
(Mautz & Sharaf, 1961, p. 1). Such a ‘theory’
considers ‘the reasons for the use of various
procedures as well as the steps in the procedures
themselves, the “why” as well as the “how” as it is
so often described’ (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961, p. 3).
This might be re-expressed as an investigation into
what is wanted from such procedures, that is, into
the objectives that such procedures are meant to
fulfil. This would constitute the desire aspect of
reasons for promulgating regulations. Specific
procedures might be derived from an ‘assumption’
about desires if a premise was added that
expressed a belief that a certain procedure would
meet the desire. These assumptions are referred to
as ‘postulates of auditing’. This is taken as the
‘starting point for the development of a structure
of audit theory’ (Flint, 1988, p. 20). They are the
‘foundation for the construction of a theory of
auditing and the formulation of principles of
practice’ (Flint, 1988, p. 21).
The Fédération des Experts Comptables
Européens (FEE) Issues Paper Principles of
Assurance: Fundamental theoretical issues with respect
to assurance in assurance engagements is concerned
with developing what it also calls a ‘foundation’
for assurance engagements of the kind that are
undertaken in audits (FEE, 2003, p. vi). This can
be understood in the sense of something that
will provide reasons, of the kind that constitute
premises in practical reasoning, for requiring
auditors to undertake certain auditing procedures.
The Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer (IdW)
specifically identifies fundamental principles
underlying an ISA audit with ‘reasons’ that lie
behind the objectives expressed in auditing
standards in their comment letter to the Clarity
Exposure Draft and Consultation Paper mentioned
above (IAASB, 2005b, p. 50). The point of
constructing a ‘foundation’ is to get agreement on
the desires that will constitute part of the reason for
deciding what duties are to be required of auditors.
Thinking about the objectives of auditing amounts
to thinking about what is wanted from auditing
and auditors. The duties that are required from
auditors will be those that will result in the
objectives of users being met. These objectives for
auditing would be used in practical reasoning of
the kind:
I want auditing to provide information X to users
(=the objectives of auditing)
I believe that requiring auditors to do Y will
result in information X being provided to users
I want auditors to do Y
I believe that by establishing a regulation that
requires auditors to do Y they will do Y
I want to establish a regulation requiring auditors
to do Y
As a result, Y becomes a duty of auditors and
agreement on objectives is required because they
constitute part of the reason for regulators choosing
to promulgate standards. Without agreement on
objectives then there may be a gap in what
regulators want auditors’ duties to be and what
others want them to be. Agreeing on what is
wanted from auditing and auditors is also relevant
in determining the meaning of ‘auditing’.
10. THE MEANING OF ‘AUDITING’
One of the characterizations of the expectations
gap referred to above was that it arises due to
differences in the meaning of ‘auditing’. A number
of writers have drawn attention to vagueness and
ambiguity in the meaning of expressions used in
the discipline of auditing. Lee draws attention to
the use of ‘labels’ in determining the nature of the
audit function and their ‘undefined nature’ which
gives rise to ‘the vagueness of the descriptions of
the associated body of knowledge’ (Lee, 1994,
p. 32). The auditing profession uses these in ‘the
social construction of the auditing profession’ (Lee,
1994, p. 31). Power observes that ‘there is no precise
agreement about what auditing really is . . . It is
wiser to speak of a cluster of definitions which
overlap but are not identical’ (Power, 1997, p. 4).
There are ‘competing meanings of audit’ and
‘the ‘social practice of “audit” does not have
a single unambiguous meaning but rather,
numerous competing meanings that exist side by
side’ (Sikka et al., 1998, p. 303). Lee ties this
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ambiguity to the expectations gap and argues that
‘the lack of definition and clarity in this area can be
argued to accentuate the audit expectations gap’
(Lee, 1994, p. 33).
If expectations arise because of different
understandings of the meaning of ‘audit’ and
‘auditing’ then this can have consequences for what
auditors are required to do. Consider the following
reasoning by an auditing standard setter or a
legislator:
I want auditors to audit.
‘Audit’ means an activity that involves auditors
doing X, Y and Z.
I believe that promulgating regulations/laws
requiring auditors to do X, Y and Z will result in
auditors auditing.
I want to promulgate X, Y and Z.
If someone else has a different definition of ‘audit’
then they may expect the regulator to impose
different duties on auditors. They may reason as
follows:
‘Audit’ means an activity that involves auditors
doing A, B and C.
Auditors will do what is required by regulators
in the audits they undertake.
Regulators promulgate regulations/laws that
require auditors to do A, B and C.
Auditors will do A, B and C.
These parties may expect regulators to define ‘audit’
in the sameway that theydo. Thismay result in them
believing that certain things are the duties of
auditors when they are not because the regulators,
having a different definition of ‘audit’, require
auditors to do different things. This may result in a
gap in beliefs about what auditors do. Even if the
gap in beliefs is addressed by pointing out that
regulators do not define ‘audit’ in the sameway and,
hence, do not establish certain duties of auditors,
theremay still be a desire for auditors to doA, B and
C and also a desire to establish a definition of ‘audit’
which involves such activities.
Wittgenstein claims that sentences that give the
meaning of expressions give rules for the meaning
of the expressions in the sentence (Baker & Hacker,
1980, p. 36). Justifying such statements is a matter
of justifying the acceptance of a rule. Given the
‘naturalistic’ view of language referred to above,
exploring the reasons for following rules of
language is a matter of setting it in the particular
context in which it emerged. In the realm of
accounting, Lyas (1993) suggests that concepts are
evaluated from the perspective of the ends of
accounting. In the case of the practice of auditing
it is a matter of identifying the ends or objectives
of auditing that constitute part of the reason for
adopting a rule for the meaning of auditing
expressions including the meaning of ‘audit’ itself.
If parties adopt different rules for the meaning of
‘audit’ then bridging the gap that results is a matter
of considering the reasons why these parties either
do or do not accept the rule for the meaning of
‘audit’. This comes down to getting agreement on
what is wanted from auditing and involves the
same sort of consideration of objectives as was
indicated above. If one wants auditing to achieve
certain objectives then one way to achieve them is
by defining ‘auditing’ or ‘audit’ such that auditors
can only be said to be doing auditing or conducting
an audit if they achieve these objectives, that is,
agreeing on what is wanted from auditing.
What also becomes clear is the potential
difficulty involved in this endeavour. The meaning
of ‘audit’ is ‘contingent and negotiable: its fixing
within relations of power is precarious and subject
to redefinition. In practice, the struggle over
meaning concerns not only the connotations
associated with audit (or other social practices), but
a struggle for access to, and control over, the
institutions and arena in which connotations are
negotiated and transformed’ (Sikka et al., 1998,
p. 304). The meaning of ‘audit’ is contested because
there are disagreements in what is wanted from
auditing. The expectation gap in meaning again
arises from this source. Given the differences in
what is wanted, the elimination of the gap might
not be possible. Unless there can be agreement
on what is wanted there may be no agreement
on what ‘audit’ means. Hines (1989) argues that
constructing a conceptual framework which might
consider matters of this kind is itself performed
in a political arena. Political considerations may
also result in contesting the definition of ‘audit’.
The contest is actually over what is wanted from
auditing. If language is ‘naturalistic then progress
in getting agreement on meanings requires an
understanding of the context in which the concepts
arose and the human interests and needs that
determine how the practice of using expressions
with meanings develops. Unless this is appreciated
then it is unlikely that much progress will be
reached on agreeing the meaning of ‘audit’.
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If expectations are understood as desires then the
expectations gap might be characterized as a gap
between:
(i) desires for auditors to have certain duties in
an audit
(ii) reasons for wanting auditors to have certain
duties in an audit
(iii) definitions of ‘audit’ and ‘auditing’
(iv) reasons for wanting to define ‘audit’ and
‘auditing’ in a certain way.
The desires in (i) are based on the reasons in (ii).
These reasons include desires for auditing and
audits to achieve certain ends or objectives. It is
these ends and objectives that constitute the
reasons for wanting to define ‘audit’ and ‘auditing’
in a certain way in (iv) and result in the different
definitions in (iii).
11. RECONFIGURING THE
EXPECTATIONS GAP
Characterizing the expectations gap as a gap in
expectations does not clearly bring out the real
nature of the issues involved. The word ‘expects’
suggests that expectations are beliefs about what
auditors will do in the future. What is often meant
by talking about expectations in the literature is
that parties have general beliefs about what
auditors do that are not solely related to what they
will do. These beliefs are based on beliefs about the
duties of auditors. Others statements about
expectations suggest that they are not entirely
beliefs about what auditors will do but express
desires for auditors to perform procedures or be
given duties or to perform such procedures or
duties in a particular way. This suggests that
expectations gaps can be more perspicuously
analysed in terms of differences in beliefs and
desires.
As an example of how this analysis might
be applied, Porter’s characterization of the
expectations gap can be re-described in terms of
beliefs and desires. The ‘reasonableness gap’ may
be a gap between what regulators and legislators
want auditors to do and what ‘society’ wants
auditors to do. The gap in desires arises due to a
difference in the reasons each party has for wanting
auditors to do something. These reasons may be
characterized as ‘unreasonable’ and give rise to
‘unreasonable expectations’ if there is a gap in
reasons. To get agreement about what is wanted
from auditors there has to be agreement on
reasons, that is, on what is ‘reasonable’. If the
reasons are ‘reasonable’ and the standard setter has
not established a duty to do something then the
standard setter has produced ‘deficient standards’
and there is a ‘deficient standards gap’. Society
may believe auditors have a duty because they
assume that standard setters want auditors to do
what is reasonable and promulgate standards that
require them to perform certain procedures. It may
be that this belief is false. Auditors who follow
these standards will not end up doing what it
is ‘reasonable’ to want them to do if there is no
standard requiring them to perform some duty.
There may be a gap in what society believes
auditors do and what they do. If the standard setter
has promulgated standards that it is reasonable
to want auditors to follow, then it is reasonable
to believe that they will follow them. If auditors
do not follow them, that is, there is ‘deficient
performance’, then the belief is false and the desire
that they follow the standards is not fulfilled. There
may be a ‘performance gap’.
12. CONCLUSION
The use of the term ‘expects’ is misleading and
should be replaced by talk of beliefs and desires.
This ties in very well with the characterization
of the expectations gap as a variance in ‘beliefs
and desires’ (Humphrey et al., 1992a, p. 2).
Reconfiguring the expectations gap in this way and
identifying the reasons for these beliefs and desires
makes it clearer how such gaps might be bridged.
Reasons for beliefs are different from reasons
for desires and these are understood in relation
to different kinds of reasoning. Only some of
the expectations gap issues can be tackled by
examining the evidence for beliefs about what
auditors do or about their duties. If beliefs are
based on ignorance then the solution is to educate
the parties that have mistaken beliefs. This is often
the response of the profession to expectations gap
issues. If expectations are desires then the gaps
need to be examined by considering the practical
reasoning from objectives to these desires. The
nature of such reasoning has been explained in this
paper. It was suggested that progress in agreeing
on what is wanted from auditors and auditing may
have to await agreement on the objectives of
auditing. Expectations gap issues will not be
resolved without a clear grasp of the kind of
expectations that are involved.
Reconfiguring the gap in this way should also
help to clarify the nature of the empirical work
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about the gap and suggest further avenues for
research. Questionnaires in such work focus on
asking the respondents whether something is an
existing responsibility of auditors and on how well
the existing responsibility is performed. Further
questions ask whether auditors should perform this
responsibility (Porter, 1993; Porter & Gowthorpe,
2004). The first two questions try to determine
beliefs about what auditors do and how well they
do it. The second address the question of desires, of
what is wanted from auditors. If the questions were
addressed in terms of beliefs and desires, this
might then prompt researchers to explore the
reasons for respondents wanting auditors to fulfil
duties. This is not explored in current research.
It is interesting to speculate as to why the
distinction is not made between expectations that
are beliefs and expectations that are desires. One
explanation is that the absence of ‘conceptual
considerations’ in auditing, as in financial
reporting (Power, 1993, p. 44), has meant that the
idea of an expectation has not been very closely
examined. Another explanation is that it has suited
the auditing profession to characterize the
expectations gap as a gap in beliefs and not to
accept that it may arise due to a gap in desires. If
‘audit objectives are constructed and transformed
within social relations of power’ (Sikka et al., 1998,
p. 299) then masking a debate about desires by
representing it as debate about beliefs may serve
to ‘disarm critics and preserve the territorial claims
of the profession’ (Sikka et al., 1998, p. 321). This
conveniently avoids potentially embarrassing
demands being made of the practice of auditing
that the profession has no desire to fulfil. It also
avoids recognizing that it might not be possible
to achieve agreement on what is wanted from
auditing. Just as the meaning of ‘audit’ develops
in a professional context so the expression
‘expectations gap’ develops in such a context. It
may be that the vagueness in the use of this
expression and the related expressions of
‘expectations’ and ‘expects’ suits certain parties in
this context. Perhaps ‘the persistence of ambiguity
seems to serve a purpose’ (Page & Spira, 2005,
p. 301). The fact that there may be a purpose does
not mean that it is a good purpose. If the profession
is serious in wanting to address the problems of the
expectations gap, it needs to acknowledge the real
nature of the expectations. This paper suggests that
the question ‘What do you expect?’ when asked of
those who have expectations about auditing should
be replaced by the questions ‘What do you
believe?’ and ‘What do you want?’. If this is done
then the nature of expectations becomes clearer and
a start can be made on a proper debate about the
expectations gap.
NOTE
1. Even the name varies from one writer to the
next. In the context of audit it has been
characterized as the ‘expectations gap’
(Humphrey et al., 1992a; Sikka et al., 1998), the
‘expectation-performance gap’ (Porter, 1993),
the ‘expectation gaps’ (ICAEW, 2006a) and ‘the
expectation gap’ (in various other writers see
references in Porter & Gowthorpe, 2004). In this
paper these terms are taken as synonymous and
the term ‘expectations gap’ is used to refer to the
issues grouped around these expressions.
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